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Abstract
The advantages that some military establishments have enjoyed in the remote Arctic region are 
diminishing. The military secrets of the Arctic Ocean are being progressively uncloaked, as civilian 
polar research expands into areas previously known only to a few. This study examines the security 
ramifications of broadened international research into what has been the most inhospitable and 
exclusive operational area on Earth. Firstly, the study argues that successful military operations 
in the Arctic depend on extended knowledge about area-specific issues related to e.g. the upper 
atmosphere and magnetosphere, weather, sea ice, ocean structure and dynamics, seafloor bathy-
metry and sediments, as well as reliable target detection systems. Secondly, it finds that a number 
of nations, both Arctic and non-Arctic, have stepped up their polar research in recent years. Secrets 
once held by a few are now accessible to many through international cooperation, data-sharing and 
open-access publishing. Finally, the study concludes that knowledge proliferation is likely to level 
the Arctic battlefield. Lending terms from Mica Endsley’s three-level Situation Awareness model, 
polar research will result in increasingly shared perceptions about the Arctic operational environ-
ment, contribute to a more uniform comprehension of the elements, and even enable new actors to 
project a future state of the Arctic environment.
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1 Introduction
Know Heaven,
Know Earth,
And your victory
Is Complete
Sun-Tzu, 544-496 BC1
1.1 Introduction
International polar researchers are relentlessly uncloaking the secrets of the Arctic 
seas, including their detailed seafloor bathymetry, ocean currents and shifting tem-
perature and salinity layers, as well as real-time variations in the atmospheric weather 
and the ionosphere above. As data and knowledge about the natural environment of 
the high latitudes is accumulated and shared internationally – through e.g. interna-
tional workshops, publications, and data-sharing – nations will increasingly acquire 
a shared basis for understanding the region’s operational environment.
The purpose of this study is to examine how extensive polar research in the Arc-
tic, as well as international research collaboration, affects the traditional advantages 
and disadvantages of the military actors in the region. The concepts of Situation 
Awareness2 and Tactical Advantage will be brought into the discussion. Mica End-
sley defines Situation Awareness as “the perception of the elements in the environ-
ment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and 
the projection of their status in the near future” (italics added).3 Tactical Advantage 
is a zero-sum concept involving two players or more in a given encounter, where the 
tactical gains of one player correspond to tactical losses on the part of the other(s).
The study presents two sets of results. The first set lists environmental parameters 
that are fundamental to military operations in the Arctic. The second set is a brief 
overview of civilian polar research in the region that provides a vital understanding 
of these elements. In its concluding discussion, the study finds that knowledge about 
the Arctic environment is now comprehensive and has proliferated internationally. 
Ultimately, as nations gain a shared basis for understanding the unique elements of 
the Arctic environment and develop similar abilities to predict its future state – to 
achieve Situation Awareness – regional knowledge ceases to be a distinct Tactical 
Advantage. The Arctic battlefield will progressively become more levelled. 
While civilian polar research certainly has military implications and may de facto 
serve dual purposes, the study does not presuppose or imply that the purposes of 
international polar research are other than peaceful. That would suggest a violation 
 1 Sun-Tzu, The Art of War (Penguin Books 2014), 81.
 2 Situation Awareness and Situational Awareness are often used interchangeably in literature.
 3 Mica Endsley, “Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems”. Human 
Factors Journal 37 (1995), 26.
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of international law. Marine research within other nations’ areas of jurisdiction is 
regulated by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, part XIII. According to 
Article 240 (a), marine scientific research “shall be conducted exclusively for peace-
ful purposes”. Furthermore, the 1920 Treaty Concerning Spitsbergen prohibits any 
use of the Svalbard islands for “warlike purposes”.4 The effect outlined in this study’s 
conclusions – a more levelled battlefield – is likely to take place regardless of the 
underlying motives of the polar research.
Nevertheless, military and civilian research are intertwined. Armed forces rely 
heavily on civilian research. Decades of massive Soviet research on meteorology, 
oceanography, ice and more has been acknowledged as one of the biggest assets 
of the Russian Northern Fleet.5 The U.S. Navy is regarded as the world’s largest 
single funder of meteorological and oceanographic research,6 which provides for 
better physical battlespace awareness in their operational forces.7 Moreover, China’s 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is known to have strongly influenced the polar 
research programs of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), the 
Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) and China’s State Oceanic Administration 
(SOA).8 
The empirical basis of this study focuses on, though not exclusively, the European 
Arctic, given its crucial role in Russia’s bastion defense as well as the region’s stra-
tegic significance to all nations that rely on access to it or relate to Russia’s strategic 
capabilities. The European Arctic also comprises the bulk of contributions to polar 
research.9 
A significant share of international research in the Arctic has been conducted in 
Norwegian areas of jurisdiction,10 including Svalbard and its surrounding areas. This 
is also reflected in the results. This region is by far the most accessible part of the 
High Arctic, due to warm currents that keep waters relatively ice-free. In addition, 
 4 Article 9.
 5 Andrei Kokoshin, cited in Kristian Åtland, “The Introduction, Adoption and Implementa-
tion of Russia’s ‘Northern Strategic Bastion’ Concept, 1992–1999”. The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 20 (2007), 499–528.
 6 National Research Council (NRC), Environmental Information for Naval Warfare (The Na-
tional Academies 2003).
 7 William Burnett et al., “Overview of Operational Ocean Forecasting in the US Navy Past, 
Present, and Future”. Oceanography 7 (2014), 24–31.
 8 Bergin et al., “Cold Calculations: Australia’s Antarctic Challenges”. Strategic Insights 66 
(2013); Anne-Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge University Press 
2017); ---, “China’s Expanding Interests in Antarctica”. Special Report. Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, 2017; Linda Jacobsen & Peng Jingchao, “China’s Arctic Aspirations”. SIPRI 
Policy Paper 34 (November 2012).
 9 Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ), Årsrapport 2017; Personal communication, 11 April 
and 10 October 2018.
 10 NJHQ, Årsrapport 2017.
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Svalbard Airport Longyearbyen, at 78 degrees north, is the world’s northernmost 
destination for regular airliner traffic.11 
1.2 The strategic Arctic – a short history
Wedged between North America and Russia, the strategic significance of the Arctic 
has long been irreducible.12 From the introduction of the atomic bomb and the out-
break of the Cold War, the Soviet Union (and later Russia) and the United States 
have faced a mutual existential threat from across the polar region. With the devel-
opment of missiles and long-range bombers in the 1950s, the region also offered the 
most expedient routes to possible targets on the other side.13 
Advances in submarine technology had profound effects on Arctic geopolitics. 
With the introduction of a nuclear power source, submarines were enabled to oper-
ate submerged for weeks and months rather than days. Their survivability was vastly 
improved, making them a feared and effective “second-strike” deterrent against any 
pre-emptive nuclear first strike. 
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles, introduced a few years later, enabled the 
submarines of the Soviet Northern Fleet to target North America without having to 
transit western anti-submarine warfare barriers outside Norway and in the Greenland- 
Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap.14 For the first time, the largest of the Soviet 
fleets posed a threat from positions close to its heavily defended northern bastion.15 
The Soviet Union’s emerging bastion defense stirred considerable fears in 
Washington. In 1981, the United States and NATO countered with a new Con-
cept of Maritime Operations, which underlined the need for forward operations, 
defense in depth and seizing the initiative at sea. The Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic, Harry D. Train II, explained that the new concept involved “sealing off 
the Soviet Navy in their home waters”,16 while U.S. Secretary of the Navy, John 
F. Lehman, claimed that the United States would attack Soviet submarines “in 
the first five minutes of the war”.17 Toward the end of the Cold War, the European 
Arctic had transformed into one of the most heavily militarized regions on Earth.18
 11 Torbjørn Pedersen, “The Politics of Presence: Longyearbyen Dilemma”. Arctic Review on 
Law and Politics 8 (2017), 95–108.
 12 Oran Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North (University 
Press of New England, 1992).
 13 Quoted in Kjetil Skogrand and Rolf Tamnes, Fryktens likevekt. Atombomben, Norge og verden 
(Oslo: Tiden Norsk forlag 2001), 62.
 14 Norman Polmar & Edward Whitman, “Hunters and Killers, Vol. II: Anti-Submarine Warfare 
from 1943”. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016).
 15 Sergei Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979).
 16 Quoted in Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Dartmouth 
Publishing, 1991), 283.
 17 Quoted in Polmar and Whitman, “Hunters and Killers”, 157.
 18 Åtland, “The Introduction, Adoption and Implementation”.
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While bringing about an East–West thaw and a sharp decline in naval activity, the 
break-up of the Soviet Union also reaffirmed the strategic role of the Arctic. The 
navy lost Baltic and Black Sea bases to Soviet successor states and had to rely even 
more heavily on its Arctic outlets to the North Atlantic. 
The massive defense around Russia’s strategic submarines and their bases still 
accounts for the geopolitical importance of the Arctic.19 The bastion defense includes 
conventional forces, a robust air defense of air force bases, anti-aircraft systems and 
early-warning radars across the Russian Arctic.20 For additional depth, Russia is 
likely to deploy considerable anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities inside the 
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap during conflict.21
Since the 2000s, the Arctic has also gained strategic significance in new but equally 
pronounced ways. In 2008, Russia named the Arctic its “primary resource base” for 
the 21st century.22 The region, which is a treasury of oil, gas and mineral deposits, 
already accounts for approximately 20 percent of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and is likely to become even more significant to Russian economic develop-
ment in the future.23
Non-Arctic nations are also showing more interest in the region, as it becomes 
more accessible amid climate change.24 Notably, China has come to define itself as 
a coming polar great power,25 and has demonstrated a keen interest in the region’s 
resource potential as well as in new sea lines of communication (SLOCs) – a “Polar 
Silk Road” – across the Arctic Ocean.26 In its 2018 Arctic Policy, the government 
asserted that the Arctic region has “a vital bearing on the interests of States outside 
the region and the interests of the international community as a whole, as well as on 
the survival, the development, and the shared future of mankind”.27 
1.3 Theoretical concepts
This study draws on theoretical concepts related to military operations, most nota-
bly  Situation Awareness and Tactical Advantage. Situation Awareness, sometimes 
labelled battlespace awareness, often refers to “the perception of the elements in the 
 19 Ekspertgruppen for forsvaret av Norge, Et felles løft (Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet 2015).
 20 Ibid.
 21 Ian Williams, “The Russia – NATO A2AD Environment”. Missile Threat, CSIS, 3 January 
2017.
 22 Kristian Åtland, “Russia’s Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?”. 
Contemporary Security Policy 32 (2011), 267–285.
 23 Lincoln Edson Flake, “Russia’s Security Intentions in a Melting Arctic”. Military and Stra-
tegic Affairs 6 (2008), 99–116.
 24 Scott Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global 
Warming”. Foreign Affairs 87 (2008), 63–77.
 25 Brady, China as a Polar Great Power.
 26 China State Council, “China’s Arctic Policy”, 26 January 2018.
 27 Ibid.
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environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their mean-
ing, and the projection of their status in the near future”.28 This definition, developed 
by Mica Endsley, suggests three levels of Situation Awareness, and the terminology 
is widely embraced by western military establishments.29 The definition also echoes 
the three-level distinction made by intelligence communities between data, informa-
tion and intelligence, in which the latter usually has a predictive element.
While Endsley has increasingly taken a user-centered approach to Situation 
Awareness,30 that is, the individual’s cognitive ability to make decisions in a highly 
dynamic environment, the concept is also widely applied at the team or shared level.31 
In general, the team or shared models see the collective Situation Awareness (SA) as 
the aggregate of individual SA, the SA of other team members, the SA of the entire 
team, and/or the common, or shared, picture.32
This study adapts and adopts the Situation Awareness concept to address the abil-
ity of a given nation’s armed forces to operate effectively in, and take advantage of, 
the Arctic operational environment. Inevitably, using the concept this way will high-
light systems over “the human factor” and thus depart from Endsley’s individual and 
cognitive emphasis. The study borrows the three-level perception-comprehension- 
projection terminology, but only to indicate different levels of understandings and 
abilities. A higher level of Situation Awareness here suggests an enhanced ability to 
operate within a given environment and predict the future state of its elements. 
Tactical Advantage is a zero-sum concept that involves at least two players. The 
tactical advantage of A over B is, put bluntly, an advantage that helps A defeat B in a 
battle. Hence, a tactical gain to A is a tactical loss to B. “In combat an environmental 
advantage for one side always means some degree of misfortune for the other,” notes 
Harold Winters.33 The zero-sum concept is also imbedded in the security dilemma,34 
which postulates that the more secure one player is, through the acquisition of more 
military power, the less secure the other player(s). The concept is widely applied 
in arms race explanations and systemic theories of international politics, specifi-
cally those highlighting relative power relationships among the great powers in the 
 28 Endsley, “Toward a Theory”, 26.
 29 See e.g., NATO, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (2013); Forsvaret, Forsvarets 
fellesoperative doktrine (2007 and 2014).
 30 Also see Mica Endsley & Debra G. Jones, Designing for Situation Awareness: An Approach to 
User-Centered Design (Boca Raton, London and New York: CRC Press 2012).
 31 For an overview, see Paul Salmon et al., “What really is going on? Review of situation aware-
ness models for individuals and teams”. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science 9 (2008), 
297–323.
 32 Ibid.
 33 Harold Winters, Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War (The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998).
 34 See e.g. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma”. World Politics 30 (1978), 
167–214. 
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international system.35 “Because one state’s gain in power is another state’s loss, 
great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other,” 
writes John Mearsheimer.36 
However, Tactical Advantage as such does not translate well into a traditional zero-
sum game or other theoretical decision-making games, since it merely states the rela-
tionship between the players in a tactical environment rather than the decision-making 
dilemmas facing those involved. The concept only establishes tactical advantage- 
disadvantage as a zero-sum dichotomy. 
Elements that give one player a tactical advantage are sometimes referred to as 
a force multiplier, that is, factors that dramatically increase the effectiveness of the 
armed forces of one side over the other in a battle. 
2 Military operations and the operational environment
2.1 Introduction
The environment strongly impacts military operations.37 Also referred to as the 
physical battlespace, the operational environment is comprised by numerous ele-
ments, both man-made and natural, and can be highly dynamic.38 The U.S. National 
Research Council has identified a series of natural parameters of particular impor-
tance to military operations, highlighting atmospheric, oceanographic, bathymetric 
and topographic, acoustic, geophysical and magnetic, and anthropogenic factors.39 
“[T]he need for adequate and accurate environmental data on small scale is para-
mount for minimizing uncertainty and reducing risk,” the Council states.40
In the Arctic, the operational environment is mostly natural (as opposed to 
man-made) – and extreme. It is vast, harsh, and isolated.41 It is predominantly a 
maritime domain, which is also reflected in this study. Still, the Arctic differs signifi-
cantly from other maritime areas, not least because it is covered by sea-ice much of 
the year and wrapped in a polar night during mid-winter. Operations in the Arctic 
“require special training, extreme cold-weather modifications for systems and 
equipment, and complex logistics support,” the U.S. Navy notes in its 2014–2030 
 35 E.g. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Bos-
ton & New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World 
Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981); John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, updated ed. (W.W. Norton & Co. 2014); A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: 
Knopf, 1958); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston & New York: 
McGrawl-Hill, 1979).
 36 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 34.
 37 Young, Arctic Politics.
 38 Endsley, “Toward a Theory”.
 39 NRC, Environmental Information for Naval Warfare.
 40 Ibid.
 41 Kyle Christensen, The Arctic: The Physical Environment (Defence R&D Canada 2010). 
DRDC-CORA TM 2010–193.
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Roadmap.42 Also, along with Antarctica, the Arctic is regarded the world’s least 
observed region.43 However, this tactically challenging environment not only poses 
risks to military operations. It also offers significant advantages to those who master 
these extremes. 
2.2 Below the surface
Submarine operations require stealth. Although hull, quieting, and propulsion tech-
nology has been constantly refined over the last few decades,44 submarine opera-
tors must still make use of the natural environment to escape acoustic detection.45 
“Prediction of the oceanographic environment is important for the proper use of 
[anti-submarine warfare] ASW sensors, as well as for other naval operations,” noted 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a 1984 report on the Soviet oceanographic 
research program.46
The Arctic seas present several notable advantages to those who seek to stay hidden. 
The region is “a beautiful place to hide”, as one admiral put it,47 since a number of 
regional features reduce the risk of acoustic detection. The ice-cover, for one, prevents 
anti-submarine warfare surface vessels and aircraft from employing various systems, 
such as towed array sensors systems, dipping sonars and sonobuoys.48 Sea ice also 
renders optical and infrared sensors ineffective and reflects or scatters laser beams.
The constantly moving, and rumbling sea ice also creates ambient noise that 
masks the sounds of the submarine.49 Moreover, the uneven ice scatters acoustic 
waves, which complicates acoustic propagation predictions further.50
The Arctic seas also have distinct temperature and salinity layers, which also scat-
ter sounds.51 As they bend and reflect soundwaves, permanent or seasonal thermo-
clines and distinct shifts in water salinity can potentially provide acoustic cover for 
 42 U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014–2030, April 2014.
 43 The World Meteorological Organization (WMO), “Year of Polar Prediction – From Re-
search to Improved Environmental Safety”. Press Release, 15 May 2017.
 44 Anthony Wells, A Tale of Two Navies: Geopolitics, Technology, and Strategy in the United States 
Navy and the Royal Navy, 1960–2015 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017); John Olav 
Birkeland, The potential of LIDAR as an antisubmarine warfare sensor. MPhil(R) thesis, Uni-
versity of Glascow, 2009.
 45 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The Soviet Oceanographic Research Program”. A 
Technical Intelligence Report SW 84–10007 (1984, declassified on 5 March 2010).
 46 CIA, “The Soviet Oceanographic Research Program”, 11.
 47 Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Watkins, quoted in Polmar & Whitman, “Hunters 
and Killers”, 157.
 48 Wells, A Tale of Two Navies.
 49 Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Sub-
marine Espionage (New York: Harper 1999)
 50 Wells, A Tale of Two Navies.
 51 Harold Doebler, “Introduction to Sonar Scattering Layers”. USL Technical Memorandum 
No. 932-77-64. (Fort Trumbull: U.S. Navy Underwater Sound Laboratory, 1964).
Polar Research and the Secrets of the Arctic
111
submarines.52 The salinity layers are seasonal and particularly distinct close to dis-
charges of freshwater from rivers and, in the case of the Arctic, melting glaciers, 
where additional sound channels and shadows, or acoustic blind zones, may appear.53 
Further, the Arctic seas are relatively shallow, which also complicates acoustic 
propagation, as the seabed also reflects and scatters soundwaves.54 Illustratively, the 
average depth of the Barents Sea, outside the Kola Peninsula, is 230 meters,55 while 
the average depth of the Atlantic Ocean as a whole is 3,646 meters. The Kara Sea 
averages a mere 131 meters. 
Ocean tides and currents also provide tactical opportunities. Currents allow sub-
marines to drift practically silently and cover considerable distances unnoticed over 
the duration of a dive,56 which could last for months. For instance, the Transpolar 
Drift could take a submerged submarine from the Kara and Laptev seas in the Euro-
pean Arctic to the Fram Strait, between Greenland and Svalbard.57 The Norwegian 
Atlantic Current, an extension of the Gulf Stream, serves as a conveyer between the 
Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and the Barents Sea. The West 
Spitsbergen Current, the northernmost extension of the Norwegian Atlantic Cur-
rent, brings a flow of warm water from the Norwegian Sea into the Arctic Ocean, just 
off the western coast of Svalbard. However, currents may also create eddies, that can 
jeopardize undersea operations.58 
Equally important is bathymetric knowledge, that is, data about the seafloor 
“topography”. Detailed underwater terrain models are essential to safe undersea 
navigation and mine counter-measures (MCM). As the Arctic is one of the least 
charted regions on Earth, a unique or superior access to high-resolution underwater 
terrain models would offer a distinct advantage. Bathymetry also strongly affects 
acoustic propagation.59 Not only the depths, but also knowledge about the bottom 
sediments is essential in undersea warfare, for a number of reasons. The composition 
and stability of the seafloor affects sound propagation,60 but it is also a critical part 
of the operational environment. For instance, firm rock allows a submarine to rest on 
 52 “SEAPROF – Undersea Acoustic Performance Prediction System”, SAES, undated. 
Accessed 25 October 2018 https://electronica-submarina.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
SAES_SEAPROF_Acoustic_Model_english.pdf;  Wells, A Tale of Two Navies. 
 53 CIA, “The Soviet Oceanographic Research Program”.
 54 Wells, A Tale of Two Navies.
 55 “Barents Sea”, The Norwegian Polar Institute, accessed 30 May 2018. http://www.npolar.
no/en/the-arctic/the-barents-sea/
 56 Sontag and Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, 329.
 57 Ibid.
 58 “PLA Navy eyes China’s deep-sea underwater glider after successful test shows it rivals US 
vessel”, South China Morning Post, 1 September 2016.
 59 Jens Hovem, Marine Acoustics: The Physical Sound in Underwater Environments (Los Altos 
Hills: Peninsula Publishing, 2012).
 60 Ibid., 59.
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the seafloor, blending in with the surrounding formations.61 Mud, on the other hand, 
could be used to bury mines.62 
Even marine biology has operational relevance. Notably, organisms reflect and 
generate acoustics and affect the optical clarity of water.63
2.3 Above the surface
One of the most appreciated force multipliers in war history is weather. From the 
failed attempt of Mongol emperor Kublai Khan to invade Japan in 1281, the defeat 
of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, to the D-Day inva-
sion in 1944, weather conditions have been credited for determining the outcome 
of battles and, thus, the course of history.64 “Despite the evolving technology in 
warfare, physical geography has a continuous, powerful, and profound effect on the 
nature and course of combat,” conclude Harold A. Winters et al. in their detailed 
account, Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War.65 “Weather 
affects soldiers, equipment, operations, and terrain. Cloud cover, wind, rain, snow, 
fog, dust, light conditions, and temperature extremes combine in various ways that 
affect human efficiency and limit the use of weapons and equipment”, summarizes 
I. M. Datz.66 
Ocean weather relates to the features of the ocean surface, where meteorology and 
oceanography meet. The structure of the sea surface includes local wind-generated 
waves as well as long ocean swells, both of which strongly impact the performance 
of surface ships. Waves are a potential hazard to navigation and a whole range of 
naval operations.67 Naval vessels, usually designed with semi-displacement V-shaped 
hulls optimized for speed and maneuverability, perform even worse in rough 
seas than civilian merchant vessels with their more U-shaped full-displacement 
hulls. Ocean weather and its inherent chaotic and turbulent motion add an addi-
tional protection layer for submarines by generating ambient noise and scattering 
acoustics. 
Atmospheric weather refers to changes in the conditions of the atmosphere over 
a relatively short period of time. The National Weather Service (NWS), the lead 
weather forecasting outlet in the United States, issues over 25 different types of 
 61 “Sea Breeze 2017 Takes Anti-submarine Warfare Training to Advanced Level”, U.S. Naval 
Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. 6th Fleet, 23 July 2017. Accessed 8 November 2018 http://www.
c6f.navy.mil/news/sea-breeze-2017-takes-anti-submarine-warfare-training-advanced-level. 
 62 Hovem, Marine Acoustics, 3.
 63 CIA, “The Soviet Oceanographic Research Program”, 18.
 64 Winters, Battling the Elements.
 65 Ibid., 4.
 66 I.M. Datz, Military Operations under Special Conditions of Terrain and Weather (New Dehli: 
Lancer 2004), 177.
 67 Jim Thomson and Erick Rogers, “Swell and Sea in the Emerging Arctic Ocean”. Geophysical 
Research Letters 41 (2014), 3136–3140.
Polar Research and the Secrets of the Arctic
113
weather warnings, statements or watches,68 which relate to e.g. flash floods, thunder-
storms, blizzards, snow and winter storms, fog, tornados, and hurricanes. Forecasts 
are essential to safe operations at sea, on land and in the air, as weather affects most 
aspects of military operations, from the advancing speed of ground forces and mis-
sile launches, to the safe operation of aircraft and the performance of space-borne 
sensors. 
In the Arctic, the polar lows are a particularly dreaded hazard during winter. These 
intense mesoscale cyclones, also dubbed “Arctic hurricanes”, are characterized by 
“severe weather in the form of strong winds, showers and occasionally heavy snow, 
which have sometimes resulted in the loss of life, especially at sea”.69 The small size of 
polar lows and their rapid development make them difficult to represent in models. 
Therefore, they are notoriously hard to predict.70  
Also, icing is a recurring hazard to air as well as naval operations in the Arctic 
region. On surface vessels, icing occurs when spray from the bow freezes on bulk-
heads, decks, and rigging.71 The ice can impede sensors and weapons, prevent deck 
operations, and reduce the ship’s seaworthiness by adding weight and shifting its 
center of gravity.72
Climate is – as opposed to weather – measured over a longer period of time. Changes 
in climate, i.e., long-term weather patterns, are putting stress on existing weather fore-
casting models. Global warming triggers more extreme weather and climate events, 
such as heat waves and drought. “Changes in climate can potentially shape the envi-
ronment in which we operate and the missions we are required to do,” acknowledges 
a 2018 U.S. Department of Defense report on the impacts of climate change.73 
Space weather is broadly defined as “the conditions on the Sun and in the solar 
wind, Earth’s magnetosphere, ionosphere, and thermosphere that can influence the 
performance and reliability of space-borne and ground-based technological systems 
and endanger human life or health”.74 It affects a range of systems crucial to military 
operations. “Known impacts include service outages, mission degradation and mis-
sion failure, data loss, sensor degradation, subsystem failure, launch delays, redesign 
 68 What’s the Difference Between Weather and Climate?”, NASA, undated. Accessed 20 
November 2018. https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/noaa-n/climate/climate_weather.
html 
 69 John Turner, Erik Rasmussen & A.M. Carleton, “Introduction”. In Erik Rasmussen & John 
Turner, eds, Polar Lows: Mesoscale Weather in the Polar Regions (Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 10.
 70 Ibid.
 71 Lasse Makkonen, “Atmospheric Icing on Sea Structures”. CRREL Monograph 84–2 (1984).
 72 Ibid.
 73 U.S. Department of Defense, “Climate-Related Risk to DoD Infrastructure: Initial Vulnera-
bility Assessment Survey (SLVAS) Report” (2018), 7.
 74 Jonathan Eastwood, “The Science of Space Weather”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
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and retest, anomaly analyses, and the ultimate cost for each of the preceding,” con-
clude H.C. Koons et al.75 
The effects of space weather are particularly pronounced in the polar regions.76 
The cusps allow charged particles to penetrate deep into the atmosphere, since they 
move more easily along inward-curving magnetic field lines. In contrast, closer to the 
Equator, the magnetic field is almost parallel to the Earth’s surface and becomes an 
effective shield against space weather.  
The bombardment of particles from space produces intense ionization in the lower 
ionosphere, which severely affects radio communications, for one. The impact on the 
ionosphere is known as the polar cap absorption effect.77 Certain frequencies may 
be completely blacked out, as high-frequency radio signals are absorbed rather than 
reflected by the ionosphere.78 This impact is “very closely associated with the occur-
rence of visual aurora and geomagnetic storms”.79 Thus, communications in the High 
Arctic is a double challenge, since the highest latitudes already are beyond the reach 
of geostationary satellites, orbiting directly above the Earth’s equator, and accord-
ingly, outside the coverage of the most common satellite communications systems. 
Moreover, changes in the ionosphere could also dramatically reduce the range of 
over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems, which also make use of the reflecting ion-
osphere to increase their range. Space weather affects satellite signals and the reli-
ability of the Global Positioning System (GPS),80 and can even damage the satellite 
itself.81 
As military operations depend heavily on technology, space weather forecasting 
has become almost as important as traditional forecasting.
2.4 Identifying targets
Other fundamental elements of the operational environment are hostile targets, 
including enemy aircraft, missiles, surface vessels, and submarines. In order for 
operators and sensor systems to detect and identify a potential target, they must 
 75 H.C. Koons et al., “The Impact of the Space Environment on Space Systems”. Aerospace 
Report No. TR-99 (1670)-1 (1999), 1.
 76 D.C. Rose & Syed Ziauddin, “The Polar Cap Absorption Effect”. Space Science Review 1 
(1962), 115–134.
 77 Ibid.
 78 Finn Lied, “Opening Speech”. In Kristen Folkestad, ed, Ionospheric Radio Communica-
tion (Springer Science + Business Media, 1968); R.D. Hunsucker & J.K. Hargreaves, The 
High-Latitude Ionosphere and its effects on Radio Propagation (Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
 79 Olav Holt, “Characteristics of Polar Cap Absorption”. In Kristen Folkestad, ed, Ionospheric 
Radio Communication (Springer Science + Business Media, 1968). 
 80 P.T. Jayachandran et al., “Canadian High Arctic Ionospheric Network (CHAIN)”. Radio 
Science 44 (2009).
 81 Baker et al. 1998.
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know some of its characteristics. A library of unique characteristics of any potential 
target – i.e., its measurements and signature –are essential to the performance of 
early-warning and weapons systems. 
As a consequence of Russia’s bastion defense, the European Arctic is a theater with 
multiple potential targets, whose measurements and signatures are of vital interest to 
various stakeholders. It is an operation area for Russia’s largest strategic fleet – and 
consequently also multiple western surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabil-
ities. The Arctic is also a testing ground for new Russian weapons systems. In sum, 
the region displays a rich variety of new platforms and weapons systems.
Below the surface, acoustics is the most important means of target detection.82 Pas-
sive sonar systems and operators seek to determine a target’s signature based on 
e.g. a submerged submarine’s propeller blade rate, shaft rate, number of propeller 
blades, cylinder firing rate, number of cylinders, power source, and/or turbine rate.83 
However, hydrophones also pick up background noise, emitted from natural as 
well as man-made sources. In the Arctic, background noise would include an assort-
ment of sources such as marine mammals, frequent storms and showers, rumbling 
ice and calving glaciers, trawlers, and creaking fishing gear.84 In order to detect a 
potential target, systems and operators must enhance the target signal and reduce 
the background noise.85 
Other detection systems include active sonars, but also different non-acoustic sys-
tems. A submarine can be detected visually, or by its wake, gas discharges, heat, 
bioluminescence, internal waves, neutrino emissions, or the Bernoulli hump, that is, 
the slight bulge in the surface created by a fast-moving submerged vessel.86 It could 
potentially also be detected by its overall electric, magnetic, seismic, and pressure 
influences.87 
Magnetic detection methods were explored extensively toward the end of the Cold 
War. To detect a target by its magnetic influences, the systems required reference 
measurements from the region. “Geomagnetic measurements provide information 
on variations in the earth’s magnetic field, the background against which magnetic 
methods for submarine detection must operate,” the 1984 CIA report states.88 The 
 82 See Polmar & Whitman, “Hunters and Killers”, 161.
 83 Arif Parvez & Syed Muhammad Raza Jafri, “Noise Effect on Surface Ship Passive Sonar 
and Possible ASW Solution”. Journal of Information & Communication Technology 7 (2013), 
31–60. 
 84 See e.g. Sontag and Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff; Hovem, Marine Acoustics.
 85 Hovem, Marine Acoustics, 282.
 86 Daniel Gerald Daly, “A Limited Analysis of some Nonacoustic Antisubmarine Warfare Sys-
tems”. Master thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994.
 87 “Underwater Multi-Influence Measurements as a Means to Characterize the Overall Vessel 
Signature and Protect the Marine Environment”, SAES, 26 October 2017. Accessed 9 
November 2018 electronica-submarina.com.
 88 CIA, “The Soviet Oceanographic Research Program”, 14.
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“magnetic anomality” created by a submarine not only stems from the hull,89 but 
also from the “change in the electromagnetic conductivity of sea water (which lasts 
for several hours) in the wake of a submarine”.90 
The wake can be detected in other ways, too. Light Detection and Ranging 
(LiDAR), a laser technology, is used to detect lingering physical phenomena in the 
submarine’s wake, which can be observed several kilometers behind the target.91 In 
the Arctic, even bioluminescent organisms, which are a dominant source of light 
during the polar night,92 may also reveal a wake, as the disturbance of a passing ves-
sel will trigger bioluminescence.93 
Above the surface, radar systems are particularly useful for target detection. Radars, 
which detect and locate objects by means of a return signal, can be mounted on most 
platforms and offer night-and-day imagery of potential targets. As with acoustics, the 
target’s radar signature is obtained and added to the comprehensive libraries that are 
integrated in radar-based detection and weapons systems.
Other sensors include optical cameras and infrared devices, notably thermal 
imagery sensors, which can read the infrared heat signatures of objects based on 
the temperature differences caused by e.g. engines and plumes. Also used to detect 
and identify targets are electro-magnetic (EM) sensors and systems, which scan a 
wide range of radio frequencies for emissions from hostile sources. Radars, radio 
transmitters, and other sources that radiate – intentionally or unintentionally – 
electro-magnetic energy, potentially reveal a distinctive emitter signature. 
3 Polar research and the operational environment
3.1 Current polar research
Civilian research in the Arctic has changed drastically in recent years. In particu-
lar, the number of actors and nationalities participating in polar research activities 
has surged. The International Polar Year (IPY) 2007–2009, which was organized 
through the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the World Meteorolog-
ical Organization (WMO) and covered both polar regions, involved more than 200 
projects, with thousands of researchers from over 60 nations.94 
The number of members of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) 
has almost tripled since it was established by the eight Arctic states in 1990. This 
 89 Daly, “A Limited Analysis”.
 90 Quoted in Polmar & Withman, Hunters and Killers, 149.
 91 Ibid.
 92 Heather Cronin et al., “Bioluminescence as an ecological factor during high Arctic polar 
night”. Scientific Reports, 2016. 
 93 CIA, “The Soviet Oceanographic Research Program”; John Strand, Clarence Pautzke and 
Gordon Mitchell, “The Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Potential of Bioluminescence Imag-
ing”. Office of Naval Research Technical Report 80–1 (1980).
 94 “About IPY”, IPY, accessed 8 November 2018. http://www.ipy.org/index.php?/ipy/about/
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non-governmental organization, which aims “to encourage, facilitate and pro-
mote cooperation in all aspects of Arctic research in all countries engaged in Arctic 
research and in all areas of Arctic research”,95 has a total of 23 permanent members, 
including national research institutions from Austria, China, the Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, South 
Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.96 
The increase in international polar research is also reflected in the turnout for 
the annual Arctic Science Summit Week (ASSW). In 2018, the summit drew a 
record crowd of 2,500 participants, who attended events such as the Arctic Business 
Meetings, the Arctic Science Symposium or the biennial Arctic Observing Summit 
(AOS).97 The summit has become steadily more popular since it was introduced in 
2013.98
In Svalbard, a number of nations have established a research presence. The Research 
in Svalbard (RiS) database, which includes metadata from finished, in-progress and 
planned research projects in the archipelago, contains entries from more than 1,500 
institutions from a total of 50 different nations.99 Ny-Ålesund, just 1,231 kilo meters 
from the North Pole, now features permanent stations run by institutions from 
China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea 
and the United Kingdom.100 While terrestrial and marine biology has dominated 
research in Svalbard for decades, atmospheric and oceanographic research is becom-
ing more popular.101 China, for instance, has atmosphere and oceanography as the 
number one and two disciplines in its Svalbard project portfolio.102
Polar research is increasingly collaborative. Even Arctic expeditions are becom-
ing international. One current example is the Multidisciplinary drifting Observa-
tory for the Study of the Arctic Climate (MOSAiC) expedition, led by Germany’s 
Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI). The one-year expedition, which will take place in 
the central Arctic Ocean in 2019–2020, is presented as the largest Arctic research 
expedition ever and involves 60 research institutions from 16 different nations across 
Europe, Asia and North America. Its stated aims are to develop an understanding of 
 95 Susan Barr, “Preface”. In Odd Rogne et al. (eds), IASC after 25 years. Special Issue of the 
IASC Bulletin (2015), 7.
 96 “IASC History”, IASC, accessed 8 November 2018. https://iasc.info/iasc/history
 97 Personal communication (e-mail), 18 October 2018.
 98 Ibid.
 99 As of 18 October 2018.
100 “Research Stations in Ny-Ålesund”, Kings Bay, accessed 8 November 2018.  https://kings-
bay.no/research/research_stations/ 
101 Rogne et al., IASC after 25 years.
102 As of 18 October 2018.
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processes and feedbacks within and between the atmosphere, ocean and sea-ice, as 
the Arctic ice cover diminishes.103
International polar researchers are also brought together by thousands of smaller 
and larger events, from classroom-sized seminars and workshops to international 
programs and panels, such as the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program 
(AMAP), set up by the Arctic Council, and the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).
With more research comes better predictions. Researchers from the Nansen Leg-
acy program, run by Norwegian research institutions, will spend more than 370 days 
at sea to “provide a 2020–2100 outlook for the expected state of climate, sea ice, 
and ecosystem, including near-term predictions”.104 The Nansen Legacy promises to 
“increase high-resolution observational capabilities leading to an increase in future 
forecast reliability”, in collaboration with international partners.105 
In-situ observations are widely shared on various platforms, such as Coperni-
cus, EMODnet and Pangaea. Further, research findings are made available through 
international publications. A journal profiling conducted by the Nordic Institute for 
Studies in Innovation, Research and Education (NIFU), shows the massive efforts 
by polar researchers to understand the natural elements of the remote polar regions 
and share their findings.106 
3.2 Ocean research
Oceanography is one of the main research disciplines in the Arctic. Traditional 
regional oceanographic research nations, notably the Soviet Union and the United 
States, competed to gain an advantage in these harsh elements. Today, research 
efforts are far more international. According to the Norwegian Joint Headquarters 
(NJHQ), the number of research vessels in the region has steadily increased, to a 
total of 44 in 2017. During the 2017 season, some of the most ice-capable research 
vessels operating on the Atlantic side of the Arctic Ocean came from non-Arctic 
nations, including China (MV “Xue Long”), Germany (RV “Polarstern”), and the 
United Kingdom (RSS “James Clark Ross”). 
A notable newcomer to Arctic oceanographic research is China, which embarked 
on its first Arctic expedition with MV “Xue Long” in 1999 and opened a permanent 
research station in Svalbard in 2004. The “Xue Long” expeditions have resulted 
in comprehensive sailing manuals for the Northeast and the Northwest passages 
103 “Developing a Process-Level Understanding”, MOSAiC, accessed 9 November 2018. 
https://www.mosaic-expedition.org/about-mosaic/the-science.html
104 “Project Description”, The Nansen Legacy, accessed 9 November 2018. https://arvenetter-
nansen.com/?page_id=2483
105 Ibid.
106 Dag Aksnes, “Norwegian Polar Research & Svalbard Research”. NIFU Report 2017:6.
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respectively. The manuals include “nautical charts and descriptions of ice conditions 
on the passage”, according to the Chinese authorities.107
In August 2012, the Chinese also deployed a 15.5-ton buoy in the Norwegian Sea 
to provide real-time meteorological and oceanographic data from 70 degrees north. 
According to Chinese research institutions, it became “the first large-scale marine 
monitoring buoy China places in the Arctic region”.108 The buoy was attached to a 
3,800-meter cable with a total of 20 different instruments, including Conductivity- 
Temperature-Density (CTD) sensors.109 
China’s oceanographic research in the Arctic is expected to expand significantly 
when MV “Xue Long 2” – a capable Polar Class 3 icebreaker – enters service in 
2019.
Standard oceanographic measurements include CTD profiling, which establishes 
the shifting water temperatures, salinity layers and pressure through the water col-
umn. Another standard measurement is water velocity. In addition, polar research-
ers collect samples of sediments and establish the bathymetry of the seafloor with 
various echo sounders. All these parameters affect acoustics and are essential to the 
calibration of precise acoustic propagation models.110 
In addition to surface research vessels and buoys, polar researchers use a whole 
variety of platforms to observe oceanographic conditions in the Arctic. Alfred Wege-
ner Institute’s deep-water observatory, Hausgarten, for instance, is a notable series 
of permanent stations in the Fram Strait, between Svalbard and Greenland. It pro-
vides “annual and continuously sensing and sampling in the water column and at 
the deep seafloor, visual observations, in situ experimental work”, according to the 
German institute,111 and the data is made available online. 
A seasonal example is Russia’s drift-ice stations, from which Russian researchers 
have surveyed the central Arctic Basin for decades.112 
Oceanographers also use commercial vessels to collect data. The FerryBox mon-
itoring system, which incorporates a number of oceanographic sensors, is found on 
MS “Trollfjord”, which traffics the coast of Norway, and MS “Norbjørn”, on the 
cargo route between the Norwegian mainland and Svalbard. The FerryBox system 
is operated by members of the European Global Ocean Observing System (Euro-
GOOS) and returns a continuous stream of oceanographic data from the European 
Arctic to international researchers.
107 State Council Information Office of China, 2017.
108 “News”, CHINARE5, accessed September 2012. http://www.chinare5.com/news/. Page 
currently unavailable.
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110 Hovem, Marine Acoustics.
111 “LTER Observatory HAUSGARTEN”, AWI, accessed 8 November 2018. https://www.awi.de/ 
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Scientific Publishing, 2008).
Torbjørn Pedersen
120
The Arctic Regional Ocean Observing System (ArcticROOS), a regional branch 
of EuroGOOS, is only one of many relevant collaborations. It comprises a network 
of 20 institutions from nine European nations working to improve observations in, 
and oceanographic models for, the Arctic region through international collaboration. 
The network has announced that it will include more members, also from nations 
outside Europe, and transform into a Global Ocean Observing System “GOOS 
Regional Alliance for the Arctic”.113 
The European Union funds a number of programs, projects, and initiatives aimed 
at internationalizing Arctic research and making in-situ observations more available. 
Integrated Arctic Observation System (INTAROS), for instance, is an EU-funded 
project to develop a common platform for searches and access to data from databases 
across the Arctic region.114 Other EU-sponsored data-sharing initiatives include Sea-
DataNet and SeaDataCloud, which aim to facilitate international access to historical 
datasets owned by various national data centers.115 
International collaboration and data-sharing also extend to bathymetry and the 
sediments of the Arctic seabed. The secrets of the Norwegian continental shelf, 
which covers a large share of the European Arctic, have also been uncovered by the 
multi-year Mareano program. Through a number of surveys, research institutions 
have provided and shared details about e.g. bathymetry, sediments, and biology on 
the Arctic seabed.116
Although high-resolution details about the seabed in coastal waters usually remain 
classified, they are becoming more readily available through end-user sharing. The 
Olex echo sounder, for instance, allows users to upload their own 3D seabed data and 
thus contribute to an increasingly comprehensive sea floor map available to all users.117 
3.3 Atmospheric research
Climate change is widely regarded as one of the major challenges facing mankind, 
and most governments and national research councils have accordingly made atmo-
spheric research a priority. As the Arctic region is warming up almost twice as fast 
as the planet’s average,118 it has become a key region for monitoring changes in the 
113 “Arctic ROOS”, EuroGOOS, accessed 9 November 2018. http://eurogoos.eu/roos/arc-
tic-roos/ 
114 “INTAROS: Integrated Arctic Observation System”, NERSC, accessed 16 November 2018. 
https://www.nersc.no/project/intaros
115 “About us”, SeaDataNet, accessed 9 November 2018 https://www.seadatanet.org/About-us/
SeaDataCloud 
116 Mareano homepage, accessed 9 November 2018. http://www.mareano.no 
117 “Collected Sea Floor Data”, Olex, accessed 8 November 2018. http://www.olex.no/dyb-
dekart_e.html 
118 “Climate Change in the Arctic: Status and Development”, The Norwegian Polar Institute, 
4 March 2014, accessed 13 November 2018. http://www.npolar.no/en/themes/climate/the- 
arctic/
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atmosphere. “We strongly note the need for increased effort and urgent attention 
supporting further international scientific collaboration focusing on the warming 
trend in the Arctic,” reads a joint statement from the Second Arctic Science Minis-
terial in October 2018.119
International collaboration not only relates to climate issues but extends to 
weather forecasting. The Polar Prediction Project (PPP), initiated by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO),120 is a 10-year project (2013–2022) set to 
improve weather and environmental prediction services for the polar regions through 
extensive international collaboration. The flagship activity of the Polar Prediction 
Project, the Year of Polar Prediction (YOPP), aims to enable “a significant improve-
ment in environmental prediction capabilities for the polar regions and beyond, by 
coordinating a period of intensive observing, modelling, verification, user-engage-
ment and education activities”.121 Relevant datasets are provided by a number of 
participating research institutions from all over the world. The models are set to 
improve predictions on different time scales, from hours to seasonal. The steering 
group includes members from 14 different nations, including China, Russia, and the 
United States.122 
Arctic weather forecasting has always been a major challenge, much due to few 
in-situ observations and the shortcomings of common models, not designed with 
Arctic conditions in mind. Now, however, models are improving and observations 
have become more numerous and internationally shared.123  
In Svalbard, extensive international research collaborations have been established 
to advance international atmospheric research. In Ny-Ålesund, which is isolated 
from all sources of pollution, the research community has defined atmospheric 
research as one of four research flagship programs. The program aims to establish “a 
unique international long-term atmospheric monitoring and observation platform” 
and create “a supersite, allowing investigations of the complex Arctic System with 
a multidisciplinary approach”.124 Flagship participants include research institutions 
from China, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Russia, South Korea 
and Sweden.
Another collaboration in Svalbard, the Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observ-
ing System (SIOS), was set up to allow researchers from different nations “to access 
119 Joint Statement of Ministers on the Occasion of the Second Arctic Science Ministerial. 
Berlin, 28 October 2018.
120 WMO, Resolution 17 at the Executive Council Meeting (EC-64), 25 June – 3 July 2012. 
121 Polar Prediction, homepage, accessed 9 November 2018. https://www.polarprediction.net
122 “Steering Group Members”, Polar Prediction, accessed 9 November 2018. https://www.
polarprediction.net/steering-group/ 
123 Personal communication (e-mail), 5 November 2018.
124 Norwegian Polar Institute, “Atmospheric research in Svalbard – a flagship program” Brief 
Report Series 022 (2011), 3.
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instruments, acquire data and address questions that would not have been practical 
or cost effective for a single institution or nation alone”.125 According to the consor-
tium of institutions from 10 nations that operate research facilities in Svalbard,126 
“SIOS focuses on processes and their interactions between the different spheres, i.e., 
biosphere, geosphere, atmosphere, cryosphere and hydrosphere”.127
Observations made in the Arctic not only feed data to various models but also 
serve as reference points for satellite-based observations. Remote sensing can be 
affected by e.g. sensor degeneration and calibration uncertainties and require valida-
tion from in-situ observations.128 Accordingly, and paradoxically, the need for in-situ 
observations increases with more remote sensing. The number of satellites in orbit is 
currently 4,871, according to the U.N. Index of Objects Launched into Space,129 up 
almost five percent from the previous year.130
The Arctic in general, and Svalbard in particular, is also well suited for research 
on space weather. Sitting under the magnetic cusp, the Svalbard archipelago has 
become a hub for ionospheric and magnetospheric research. The EISCAT Svalbard 
radar facility, located just outside Longyearbyen, featuring one 32-meter steerable 
and one 42-meter fixed antenna, provides valuable measurements of the ionosphere 
and the atmosphere for EISCAT partners. 
Space weather is also observed with optical sensors. The Kjell Henriksen Obser-
vatory (KHO), next to the EISCAT radars, is the only permanent observatory that 
allows international researchers to observe daytime aurora, that is, during the polar 
night.131 Other auroral observation sites in the European Arctic for night-time obser-
vations include Apatity (Russia), Kiruna (Sweden), and Tromsø (Norway).132 The 
latest addition to optical auroral observatories in northern Europe is the China- 
Iceland Joint Arctic Science Observatory (CIAO) at Karholl (Iceland).133 
125 “The Observing System”, SIOS, accessed 9 November 2018. https://sios-svalbard.org/Ob-
servingSystem 
126 “The SIOS Consortium”, SIOS, accessed 9 November 2018. https://sios-svalbard.org/Con-
sortium 
127 “The Observing System”, SIOS.
128 See e.g. Paul Simon, “Lecture 2: Instrument intercomparison”. ESA – National Remote 
Sensing Center of China (NRSCC) Dragon Program, 19 October 2006.
129 “Online Index of Objects Launched Into Space”, U.N. Office of Outer Space Affairs, 
accessed 13 November 2018. http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jspx?lf_id= 
130 Ibid.
131 Network for Groundbased Optical Auroral Research in the Arctic Region, In the Light of the 
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133 “The Construction at Karholl”, China-Iceland Joint Arctic Observatory (CIAO), accessed 8 
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3.4 Polar research and target detection
Target detection relies on various sensors. According to the U.S. Intelligence Com-
munity, sensors used in Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) 
“include, but are not limited to, radar, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear, radiation 
detection, spectroradiometric, and seismic systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid 
material sampling systems”.134 These sensors also have non-military research appli-
cations and are also found on civilian platforms. Civilian and military hardware, 
firmware, and software – as well as their performance – may well be vastly different. 
However, increasingly, armed forces use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equip-
ment,135 which inevitably narrows the gap in the performance of military and civilian 
systems.
Below the surface, sonars are used extensively in polar research. Passive sonars are 
employed in Arctic studies of underwater biological activity, particularly involving 
marine mammals, but also to monitor non-biological dynamics, such as calving gla-
ciers and melting ice. They are also integrated in the towed streamers used in seis-
mic profiling, to survey sub-bottom layers. The seismic survey set-up is supposedly 
similar to arrays used in anti-submarine warfare. “In principle, the same techniques 
can be used to locate submarines, except that the submarine becomes the source of 
energy received by the hydrophone array,” the CIA report concludes.136 
Hydrophones are also employed in studies of man-made noise. A number of proj-
ects have aimed to explain how the sounds of ships, seismic air guns, and pile-driving 
harm, disturb, and confuse marine life.137 A prerequisite for such studies is to iden-
tify the various frequencies emitted from these sources. A single vessel, for instance, 
creates sounds from moving parts of the main and service engines, propellers, cavita-
tion, vibrations in the hull, etc.138 In sum, researchers contribute to a comprehensive 
understanding of ocean acoustics, which is also relevant for target detection.
Polar researchers use a number of other sensors that could potentially also be used 
in anti-submarine warfare, such as state-of-the-art multi-beam sonar arrays, magne-
tometers, microstructure profilers, which detect internal waves and turbulence on 
a micro-scale, and airborne LiDAR systems. The latter is employed in bathymetric 
surveys. In Svalbard it is used to map changes in glaciers and ice caps.139 
134 U.S. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “IC21: The Intelligence Community in 
the 21st Century”. Staff Study (1996). Accessed 1 June 2018. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/GPO-IC21/html/GPO-IC21-7.html
135 Daly, “A Limited Analysis”.
136 CIA, “The Soviet Oceanographic Research Program”, 13.
137 Øystein Solheim Pettersen, “A Study of Radiated Noise from Fishing Vessels”. MSc Thesis, 
NTNU, 2017.
138 Ibid.
139 Jonathan Bamber et al.,“Elevation changes measured on Svalbard glaciers and ice caps from 
airborne laser data”. Annals of Glaciology 42 (2005).  
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New and promising oceanographic research platforms also have anti-submarine 
warfare application. Notably, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) are increas-
ingly used in polar research.140 These vehicles have several advantages over tra-
ditional research platforms, as they can access shallow waters and operate under 
sea-ice.141 Underwater gliders, one type of AUVs using buoyancy-based propulsion, 
have proven particularly effective as a research platform in the Arctic Ocean.142 Their 
extreme endurance make them highly attractive both as research and anti-submarine 
warfare platforms. Inexpensive and expandable, they are well suited for mine counter- 
measures (MCM) purposes. 
Above surface, radars have countless civilian applications. Outside Longyearbyen, 
the two European Incoherent Scatter (EISCAT) radars have allowed operating part-
ner institutions from China, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, as well as others, to observe disturbances in the ionosphere and 
magnetosphere. However, the dual-purpose potential of research radars has been 
subtly acknowledged by the Norwegian authorities. When China offered to add a 
third radar – a 50-meter antenna – to the EISCAT facility in Svalbard, the govern-
ment declined, citing that “the technology also has other uses”.143 In addition to sup-
plementing the existing research areas, the purpose of the new Chinese antenna was 
to map and track space debris as well as “measuring astronomical objects” at a high 
resolution with a Very Long Base Interferometer (VLBI).144 Mainland EISCAT radar 
facilities have already been tested for space debris tracking. The Tromsø (Norway) 
site has proved able to detect objects down to two centimeters in size, at an altitude 
of 500 – 1,500 kilometers.145
Polar research is also advancing and refining unmanned aerial technology. The 
Arctic has recently become a notable laboratory for unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs). In Ny-Ålesund, international researchers collaborate to overcome chal-
lenges related to the extreme environment of the Arctic, such as poor battery per-
formance, icing on wings, propellers and sensors, and command-and-control issues 
in a region that lacks mobile phone infrastructure and broadband geostationary 
140 Maxime Geoffroy et al., “AUV-based acoustic observations of the distribution and patchi-
ness of pelagic scattering layers during midnight sun”. ICES Journal of Marine Science 74 (9) 
(2016).
141 Summarized in ibid. 
142 See e.g. Acoustic Technology for Observing the interior of the Arctic Ocean (ACOBAR), an 
EU FP7 project (2008–2012) coordinated by Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing 
Center (NERSC). https://acobar.nersc.no 
143 Lars Egil Mogård, “Nord nei til Kina-radar på Svalbard”, NRK, 11 September 2014.
144 Multiconsult, “Delplan for EISCAT Svalbard Radar: Beskrivelse og bestemmelser”. 17 
December 2012.
145 Heiner Klinkrad et al., “Europe’s Eyes on the Sky: A Proposal for a European Space Surveil-
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satellite communication coverage.146 Technological advances here would inevitably 
be transferable to target detection platforms and make them more capable of Arctic 
operations.
4 Arctic secrets uncloaked
4.1 Proliferation of knowledge
Polar researchers are incrementally understanding more of the remote Arctic envi-
ronment. A number of nations, both Arctic and non-Arctic, are currently conducting 
polar research in this sensitive operational area. Expeditions and programs usually 
involve multi-national teams, and in-situ observations made available online. Mas-
sive research efforts in recent years alone have produced thousands of articles on 
Arctic matters in peer-reviewed publications.147 
Polar research nations have committed to sharing even more of their research 
data. The Scientific Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force in 2018, is 
adopted by the eight members states of the Arctic Council. According to Article 7 
of the agreement, 
The Parties “shall support full and open access to scientific metadata and shall 
encourage open access to scientific data and data products and published results with 
minimum time delay, preferably online and free of charge or at no more than the cost of 
reproduction and delivery.148
The Arctic states are also committed to “facilitate the distribution and sharing of 
scientific data and metadata”.149
In the same spirit, national and European research funders increasingly insist on 
open-access publication of research that has received national funding. In September 
2018, the research councils of Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as the 
European Commission, announced a joint initiative to “make full and immediate 
Open Access to research publications a reality”.150 
The sum amounts to a vast proliferation of data from, and knowledge about, the 
Arctic operational environment. Relentlessly, elements of the operational environ-
ment have become more familiar to a wider audience. Meteorological and oceano-
graphic data, ice charts, atmospheric and ionospheric studies, acoustic propagation 
146 Torbjørn Pedersen, “Collaboration on Drone Issues”. Svalbard Science Forum Newsletter, 
8 April 2016. 
147 Aksnes, “Norwegian Polar Research”.
148 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperaton (adopted 11 May 
2017, entered into force 23 May 2018), Article 7.
149 Ibid.
150 “cOAlition S”, Science Europe, 4 September 2018. Accessed 9 November 2018. https://
www.scienceeurope.org/coalition-s/ 
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predictions, and even Arctic-adapted UAV and glider technology, are already readily 
accessible across national borders. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States competed to get 
the better understanding of the operational environment. The 1984 CIA report con-
cluded that the Soviets tried to “offset pronounced U.S. advantages in acoustic sub-
marine detection” by gaining a better understanding of oceanographic conditions.151 
The agency assessed that “the strongest civilian efforts seem to be in theoretical 
ocean dynamics to support both ASW and weather research. In general, the quality 
of many Soviet efforts is improving at a rate that could make them the world leaders 
in most fields of oceanography”.152
The current proliferation of environmental data and knowledge will inevitably 
assist more stakeholders in achieving a similar Situation Awareness of the region. 
The trend may ultimately diminish the Tactical Advantages of traditional stakehold-
ers, who, until now, could turn superior knowledge of the Arctic operational environ-
ment into a force multiplier. 
4.2 Environmental data and situation awareness
Situation Awareness in the Arctic operational environment involves a clear percep-
tion of all the relevant elements of the area. As the Arctic Ocean is a harsh and largely 
ice-covered maritime area, and surrounded by scarcely populated or uninhabited 
islands and territories with little or no infrastructure, this study has stressed the 
importance of understanding the natural elements of this predominantly maritime 
Arctic environment, both below and above the ocean surface. In addition, vital to 
any military operation is also the ability to detect targets.
Polar research is indeed highly relevant for military operations in the Arctic. As 
demonstrated above, an understanding of the natural elements is paramount to all 
operations – undersea, surface, or aerial – and can determine the outcome of a given 
battle.
The accelerating flow of environmental data from the Arctic seas does not translate 
directly into a high-level or internationally shared Situation Awareness. In the mod-
ern Information Age, assimilating in-situ observations and data into actually needed 
information may potentially be as large a challenge as collecting them.153 Developing 
Situation Awareness is in some ways indistinguishable from intelligence tradecraft, 
which involves the processing of data and information into assessments and predic-
tions (intelligence) that their audience can act on. Situation Awareness “involves far 
more than merely being aware of numerous pieces of data. It also requires a much 
151 CIA, “The Soviet Oceanographic Research Program”, iii.
152 Ibid, iv.
153 Endsley & Jones, Designing for Situation Awareness.
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more advanced level of situation understanding and a projection of future system 
states”, Mica Endsley finds.154  
The challenges of assimilating clutters of environmental data into higher levels of 
Situation Awareness can be illustrated by the complexities of the U.S. Navy Envi-
ronmental Prediction System. This state-of-the-art system combines 4-Dimensional 
Variational Data Assimilation (4D-VAR), at least two different ocean circulation 
models, four waves, surf and tides models, two ice models, and three atmospheric 
models.155 The system provides real-time, high-resolution and three-dimensional 
models of the operational environment. Predictions and forecasts are continuously 
updated, as these data assimilation schemes allow the continuous inflow of data from 
various sensors, both in-situ and remote.156 
Notwithstanding, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) models and systems are rap-
idly becoming more sophisticated and offer increasingly better predictions. Improve-
ments in commercial models and systems are likely to continue, as demand from 
civilian users grows and computer processing power increases. Widely available and 
improved systems, as well as broader international collaboration and data-sharing, 
will inevitably affect Situation Awareness and enable more stakeholders to make 
better predictions of the state of Arctic elements.
4.3 Leveling the Arctic battlefield
While civilian research is increasingly collaborative, military confrontations are 
crudely competitive. As noted, one actor’s tactical advantage translates into an 
adversary’s disadvantage. “[T]hat navy possessing a superior knowledge of the envi-
ronment and knowing how to take tactical advantage will be the victor,” Admiral 
of the Soviet Fleet, Sergey Gorshkov, once stated.157 The same appreciation is also 
found in modern military doctrines. “The commander who can best measure and 
take advantage of the weather and terrain conditions has a decided advantage over 
his opponent,” asserts a U.S. Army Field Manual.158 
Russia assumes that it holds a distinct advantage over others in the Arctic due to a 
range of factors, including extensive civilian, military and dual-use infrastructure as 
well as military training activity in the region, but also because of its long tradition of 
polar research. As acknowledged by Andrei Kokoshin, who held high-ranking posi-
tions within the Russian Ministry of Defense and on the Defense Council during 
the 1990s:159
154 Endsley, “Toward a Theory”.
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The North suits us best of all; the efforts and sacrifices of Russian and Soviet polar 
explorers have provided us with an enormous, unique knowledge relating to the Arctic 
regions – [knowledge about] ice conditions, hydrology and hydrography, climate and 
weather conditions, etc. This gives Russia important advantages in this zone, particularly 
for submarines160
Others suggest that the United States holds the upper hand in the High Arctic. 
Anthony Wells, who has worked for both U.S. and British intelligence as well as their 
navies, asserts that the United States has “a huge tactical advantage over any threat 
under the Arctic ice”,161 partly due to its vast research on acoustic propagation under 
the icecap. 
Most aspects related to undersea warfare are classified in nature,162 and this study 
certainly does not have the prerequisite to conclude on which nation holds an advan-
tage over others in an Arctic zero-sum game. However, it does postulate that the 
international proliferation of knowledge about the Arctic operational environment 
diminishes the tactical advantages that decades of Russian and U.S. polar research 
may have provided. As the secrets of the Arctic are uncloaked, and as differences in 
Situation Awareness (SA) across nations become less pronounced, the battlefield is 
correspondingly more levelled. 
The implications are paradoxical. Most challenges facing mankind, spanning 
from human health issues to broader ramifications of global warming, call for broad 
international research collaboration. Through multi-national projects, international 
workshops, data-sharing and publications, the quality of research is improving. Shar-
ing also allows for replication, validation, and extension of empirical results.163 A bet-
ter understanding of the Arctic environment is essential, not only in order to govern 
regional ecosystems or safeguard human life and property at sea, but also to predict 
the effects of climate change on a global scale. International research collaboration 
is, in this context, to everyone’s benefit. As noted in a joint statement at the Second 
Arctic Science Ministerial:
Costs can be reduced, and outcomes improved, by further promoting the sharing 
of research infrastructure and observing systems, and by making scientific data and 
publications – whenever possible – freely and openly available164
Still, this study stresses that polar research also has a zero-sum dimension. As demon-
strated, the stakeholder with the best knowledge of a given operational environment 
160 Kokoshin, translated in Åtland, “The Introduction, Adoption and Implementation”, 509.
161 Wells, A Tale of Two Navies, 62.
162 Kathleen Hicks et al., “Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe”. A Report of the CSIS 
International Security Program (2016), viii.
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may also provide a Tactical Advantage for its military units in a battle. Indeed, supe-
rior Situation Awareness represents a force multiplier. 
The implication is that the stakeholders who master the Arctic extremes could 
benefit from slowing the proliferation of knowledge and keeping the region exclusive, 
contrary to prevailing trends. In order to maintain a potentially decisive advantage 
if push comes to shove, protecting the secrets of the Arctic operational environment 
might be in a nation’s best interest.
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